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In this study, we present a canonical static disequilibrium model which is micro-
founded. The model includes standard optimization, stochastic quantity rationing,
and market friction. In temporary equilibrium, every agent makes a decision un-
der perceived quantity signals of all markets. This specifies market spill-over effect
which could be interpreted as dual-decision effect. In temporary equilibrium, mar-
ket friction mixes classical and Keynesian mechanism for unemployment so that
the non-Walrasian regime dividing becomes obscure.
1 Introduction
Microfoundation of Keynesian macroeconomics has been an important issue of macroe-
conomics.
We have two types of models to treat (notional) disequilibrium in general equilibrium
framework.1 The first one comes from Bénassy (1975). His work extends Barro and
Grossman (1971), which present a mathematical interpretation of Clower (1965). It
highlights dual decision hypothesis, in which the expressed demand (and supply) depends
on the realized transaction in the other markets. Suppose that individuals exchange N
commodities. The utility function is U(z), where z is the excess demand vector. The
expressed excess demand zB or, Bénassy demand,2 is derived from the following problem:
∀i, max
zi
U(zi, z−i) subject to z−i ∈ B(z−i)
where z−i is the set of the excess demands excluding zi and B(z−i) is the (perceived)
quantity constraint for them. This formulation implies that the individuals determines
the demand expression of one good following the signals of quantity constraints in the
other markets but that they do not perceive any constraint on that good. Bénassy
demand specifies the spill-over effect among markets, but it is not consistent with standard
∗Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto (Email:
ogawa.shougo.54e@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp).
1For the survey of these approaches, see Grandmont (1977) and Svensson (1980).
2It has various namings such as Barro-Grossman-Bénassy demand and Clower demand. We utilize
the name Bénassy since the rigorous formulation is written for the first in Bénassy (1975).
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microeconomics. We should solve the different maximization problems for N times, and
the expressed excess demand could violate the budget connstraint, that is, p · zB > 0.
The second one comes from Drèze (1975). The central aim of this work seems the
extension of general equilibrium framework. The incomplete price mechanism causes




U(z) subject to p · z ≤ 0, z ∈ B(z)
where B(z) is quantity constraint. Usually, B(z) is described with the upper and lower
bounds of transaction: B(z) = ΠNi=1[zi, z̄i]. This Drèze demand is a simple extension of
excess demands in general equilibrium framework. In this model, however, the realized
transaction and the expressed excess demand always match, which means that disequi-
librium is not observed and how quantity constraints are generated is not specified.
These defects are generated since the framework is deterministic; the economic indi-
viduals decide the demand and supply under determinate quantity constraint. Following
the determinate quantity constraints and usual microfoundation (optimizing under per-
ceived constraint) could not coexist properly, as shown above.3 Therefore we should use
a stochastic framework to built microfoundation which is consistent with standard mi-
croeconomic models.
In the stochastic rationing framework, the quantity rationings on individuals stochas-
tically happen. The individuals use quantity signals such as market tightness to expect
the rationing on their demand or supply. Using this framework loosens the interconnec-
tion between the realized transactions and the perceived quantity constraints so that we
could overcome the defects in deterministic disequilibrium models.
The stochastic rationing framework is pioneered by Gale (1979) and Svensson (1980),
both of which are written as drafts in 1977. Although Svensson used non-manipulable ra-
tioning scheme, in which the rationed individual could not change the realized transaction
quantity by overbidding their transaction offers, Green (1980) proved that the manipu-
lable rationing scheme is desirable to attain the feasible stochastic equilibrium. Weinrich
(1984) also shows that manipulable rationing scheme is compatible with nontrivial equi-
librium in a continuum economy. As these works are too abstract, it is difficult to derive
some intuition about macroeconomic features such as unemployment. For application
to macroeonomics, Ioannides (1983) and Honkapohja and Ito (1985) constructed simple
three commodities (produced goods, labor and money) models.
However, Honkapohja and Ito’s work seems to have a problem to describe an economy
with uncertainty: they utilize the short-side rule to individuals’ rationings. The short-
side rule argues that the transaction quantity is determined by the short side so that the
long side should be rationed. They assumed that the short-sided individuals expect no
quantity rationing on their demand or supply. In a situation with unemployment (the
aggregate labor demand is smaller than supply), for instance, every firm believes it could
hire the planed amount of workers. This assumption is unrealistic when we consider
about matching process, in which every agent faces uncertainty.4
Matching process, on the other hand, has been modeled and applied to macroeconomic
analyses, such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). However, these analyses are restricted
3Weinrich (1984) supplies a concise explanation.
4Of course, the market frictions and the searching process are not the resource of Keynesian unem-
ployment; see Negishi (1979, Chapter 2). This paper presents a disequilibrium model which includes
Keynesian, classical and frictional unemploymemt.
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by equilibrium models, which mean the quantity constraint does not play a significant role.
These days, Michaillat and Saez (2013, 2015) uses a frictional matching model in order to
explain Keynesian unemployment. They assume that the transactions in goods and labor
markets are determined by the matching function with transaction costs. In their simple
model, the market tightness in each market could be different from the efficient level,
and this difference could be interpreted as a kind of disequilibrium. That is, their model
has four inefficient regimes depending on the tightness of each market, e.g., product-tight
and labor-slack. Although they explain the regime-dividing mechanisms and refer to the
basic general disequilibrium model of Barro and Grossman (1971), it is hard to justify
that their model is an extension of Keynesian disequilibrium model.
The most important issue in disequilibrium school is the quantity constraints on in-
dividuals’ demand and supply. The market ”disequilibrium” means not only the gap be-
tween expressed demand and expressed supply but also the discordance between planed
(expected) transaction and realized transaction. To model disequilibrium economics, we
should describe how markets are correlated with spill-over effect, which is specified by
dual-decision mechanism. That is, the demand or supply of one individual must de-
pend on the (expected) realized transaction quantities in other markets, as well as other
economic variables, e.g., price.
In this paper, we present a simple micro-founded model which treats dual-decision
effect. The model has the following features. (1) Each agent solves their optimization
problem so that the model is ”micro-founded.” (2) The good and labor markets are
directly and completely connected by the dual-decision hypothesis. (3) Market friction is
included in that the both side could be quantity constrained even if the one is on short
side. The model has two aspects. First, it is a re-interpretation of Green (1980) from
macroeconomic perspective. We specify how quantity signals affect the agents’ decision
problem. Second, it is an extension of Michaillat and Saez (2015). We will show how
markets are interconnected by dual-decision system without any wedge, e.g., access costs.
This paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we present a canonical static model.
Every agent is stochastically rationed and makes her decision using quantity signals. After
the mathematical analysis, we discuss some possible extensions in section 3. In section 4,
we discuss dynamic analysis. There are obstacles to proceed dynamic model which treats
non-Walrasian concepts, so we clarify what problem is left for future analyses. In section
5, we conclude our analysis.
2 The model
In this section, we present a simple model in which the transactions of goods and labor
are determined by matching functions. In our model, households indexed i and firms
indexed j deal with goods Y and labor L.
2.1 Rationing and matching mechanism
First, we formulate the transactions of goods x, x = Y, L. According to the standard
matching theory, the aggregate quantity of realized transcation X is determined by the
function gX :
X = gX(Xd, Xs), (2.1)
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where the subscript d is the expressed demand ofX and s is expressed supply, respectively.
We utilize the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The matching function gX : R2+ → R+ has the following properties:
1. gX is an increasing function in both Xd and Xs.
2. gX(Xd, Xs) ≤ min{Xd, Xs} always holds.
3. gX is at least twice continuous differentiable.
4. gX is linear homogeneous.
The first one is a natural but slightly strict assumption. When the expressed (and
announced) demand and supply increase, the realized transaction also increases. We can
insteadly use a non-decreasing fucntion, which is more general, but we set the strictly
increasing function for the simplicity. The second one is explained by voluntary exchange
property in disequilibrium economics, which ensures that the individuals are not forced
to buy (or sell) the more goods than they would like to. The third and fourth ones are
assumed for mathematical simpicity.
2.2 Basic framework
There are two types of agents: households and firms. The households are employed by the
firms and buy the goods to consume. The firms use the employed workforce to produce
the goods and sell them.
Each agent k receives the quantity signals for aggregate transactions (Y d, Y s, Ld, Ls)
and they determine the quantities of expressed demand and supply. For instance, the
household i expresses Cdi and L
s
i depending the aggregated quantity signals. Note that
these quantities are only signals so that they are not always same as the expected trans-
action quantities.
Each agent k is supposed to know the probability distributions of the realized trans-
actions of goods and labor Xk, X = L, Y which depend on the aggregate quantity signals







k), ξ = d, s, (2.2)
where Xk is a random variable and x̃k is the quantity signal of x which the agent k
receives. For the simplicity, we use the following assumptions:5
Assumption 2. Xk is proportional to X
ξ
















< 0 if ξ = d
> 0 if ξ = s
(2.3)
where θk = X
d/Xs is a market tightness for X.
5The proportional rationing is a natural formulation under standard assumptions; see Green (1980);
Weinrich (1984).
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Assumption 3. The quantity signal is homogenous and is a function of the actural
aggregate quantity θX :
θ̃Xk = θ̃
X(θX) ∈ [0, 1], θ̃X
′
(θX) > 0. (2.4)




X)] ∈ (0, 1], where Ek is the expectation operator for k.
2. If h(φXk ) is monotonically increasing in φ
X
k , then Ek[h(φ
X
k )] is increasing in φ
X
k when
individual k supplies X and decreasing in φXk when individual k demands X.
Households are indexed by i and they are unifromly distributed on I with positive
measure. They initially hold moneyM0i. Their real income flow consists of the dividend πi
and labor income wLi where w is real wage. They consume Ci and reserve the moneyM1i.
Therefore the realized transactions of Li and Ci always satisfies the following equation:
M1i/P + Ci = wLi + πi +M0i/P. (2.5)
However, each household does not know the quantities of realized transactions when they
determine their expression Cdi , L
s
i , and M1i. We suppose that they make decision to
satisfy the following expected budget constraint:
M1i/P + Ei[Ci] = wEi[Li] + Ei[πi] +M0i/P, (2.6)
where Ei is an expectation operator for i. It means that the households choose the
expressed quantities to satisfy the budget constraint with expected quantities.
Following Assumption 2, the expected budget constraint is revised as follows:
M1i/P + Ei[φi(θ̃
Y )]Cdi = wEi[φi(θ̃
L)]Lsi + Ei[πi(θ̃
Y , θ̃L)] +M0i/P. (2.7)
The preference of each household is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstein utility
function ui which satisfies expected utility hypothesis. ui is supposed twice continuous
differentiable, increasing in Ci andM1i/P , and decreasing in Li. Therefore, the household





Ei[ui(Ci, L̄− Li,M1i/P )] subject to equation (2.7) and L
s
i ≤ L̄, (2.8)
where L̄ is the upper limit of labor supply.
To make the solution simple, we use the following assumption;
Assumption 4. The von-Neumann Morgenstein utility function ui is separable, that is,
ui(Ci, L̄− Li,M1i/P ) = ũi(Ci, L̄− Li) + ūi(M1i/P ) (2.9)






> 0, X = Ci, L̄− Li, (ūi)
′ > 0, (ūi)
′′ < 0.
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Suppose that first order conditions hold when the expected utility is maximized under











Y , θ̃L)] +M0i/P − Ei[φ
C
i (θ̃











Y , θ̃L)] +M0i/P − Ei[φ
C
i (θ̃
Y )]Cdi ) = 0.
We assume that the cross term effect on marginal utility is small enough to be ignored. In
other words, the absolute value of ∂
2ũ
∂Ci∂(L̄−Li)
is sufficiently small.6 Furthermore, we assume
that the expected dividend income is not sensitive to the current quantity signals. Then,









































The goods demand and the labor supply is positively correlated since buying goods needs
sufficient (labor) income. The first equation is about goods demand. When the labor
market is tight, the employment is expected secure so that Cdi is increasing in θ̃
L. Since
the ample budget promotes consumption, Cdi is increasing in w and M0i.
The second condition is about labor supply. Large θ̃Y makes the households difficult to
buy the planned amount of consumption goods, which would reduce the realized expense.
This implies that the households do not need labor income so much, and therefore Lsi is
decreasing in θ̃Y . The effect of w is ambiguous since it has substitution effect and income
effect on labor supply. The other ways to secure the budget reduce necessity of labor
income so that Lsi is decreasing in M0i/P .
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must be discussed. This ambiguity of “own-market effect” comes from ma-
nipulability of rationing scheme. Our stochastic rationing scheme shown in Assumption
2 is manipulable in that the large expression of demand or supply increases the expected
transaction. Let us change our perspective to the rationing coefficient φCi to see how
the manipulability works on the first order conditions. Large φCi induces two different




i ) increases at given C
d
i , which low-
ers the marginal utility of consumption. On the other hand, the complimentarity of φCi
lowers the expression of goods demand Cdi , which would increase the marginal utility of
consumption. These conflicting effects make the sign of
∂Cdi
∂θ̃Y
ambiguous. In addition to it,
the dividend income also works on the ambiguity. If the household expects high dividend
income because of active market (high θ̃Y ), it would increases the consumption demand.
Figure 1 shows the two dual decision process. The crossing point of the curves is
the point on which the household determines the expressions of goods demand and labor
supply simultaneously.
6When the utility from consumption is separable from that from leisure, the cross term becomes zero.
For instance, a log linear utility function satisfies this condition.
7If the devidend income is not a stochastic variable, then the labor supply is decreasing in πi.
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Figure 1: First order conditions of household i

































As we introduce the utility of leisure (disutility of working), the existence of another source
of revenue declines the labor supply. In ordinal microeconomic theory of household, this
is intuitive. The ambiguity of effect of wage on labor supply is also a common problem
which is caused by the substitution effect and income effect.
Note that the determinations of the expressions of goods demand and labor supply
overcomes the defects of Drèze demand and Bénassy demand. Households determines
only expressions, not the realized transaction. It implies that the quantity gap between
the expressed demand (or supply) and the realized transaction could occur for each
household. What is important is that the expressions are consistently affected by the
quantity signals not only of own market but also of the other market, which means they
are derived through the dual-decision path.
We should discuss the ambiguity of the effect of market tightness, e.g., the sign of
∂Cdi
∂θ̃Y
. Michaillat and Saez (2015) gains the goods demand decreasing in the goods market
tightness using market friction. When the goods market is tight (demand is relatively
large), the buyers must access the market many times since the matching probability is
low for them. It means the cost of purchasing goods is high, which declines the goods
demand.
In this paper, we utilize the stochastic rationing instead of market friction as an
extension of general disequilibrium model. The market tightness, which works as a quan-
tity signal, affects the goods demand expression through several paths. The tight goods
market decreases the expected realized goods transaction. As mentioned above, the own-
market effect is ambiguous without market friction. The spill-over effect is obvious: the
small expected transaction declines the other expression, as
∂Lsi
∂θ̃Y
< 0. The decline of
labor supply lowers the goods demand expression, so that the spill-over effect indirectly
decreases the goods demand.




In this paper, we suppose that the consumption demand is not sensitive decreasing in

















Figure 2: How goods market tightness affects the goods demand expression
the following subsection. Following empirical studies and usual macroeconomic studies,
furthermore, we suppose that the expression of labor supply is increasing in real wage
rate.8











































Firms, which are indexed j and uniformly distributed on J with positive measure,
produce goods using employed workforce and sell them. The production technology is
described as the following production function:
Ŷj = Fj(Lj), (Fj)
′ > 0, (Fj)
′′ < 0, (2.14)
where Ŷj is the amount of produced goods with the realized employment Lj. Each firm
j initially holds the inventory Inv0j. We suppose that the firm evaluate the inventory
at the end of the term Inv1j with function vj. Therefore, the real net return on the
production and employment rj consists of the real profit and the real value of inventory:
rj = πj + vj(Inv1j) = Yj − wLj + v(Fj(Lj)− Yj + Inv0j). (2.15)
The firm choose the expressions of goods supply Y sj and labor demand L
d
j to maximize





Ej[rj] subject to Inv1j ≥ 0 with probability 1. (2.16)
The first order conditions are as follows:











′F ′; θ̃Y , θ̃L] = 0. (2.18)
8Frisch elasticity is estimated positive in both microeconomic and macroeconomic studies; see Peter-
man (2016).
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These conditions are rearranged as follows:































First, note that the goods supply and the labor demand inversely work on the marginal
value of inventory so that they are positively correlated in the first order conditions.
The first condition is about the determination of goods supply. The large labor
demand should accord with the large goods supply so that Y sj is increasing in L
d
j . However,
the tight labor market makes the firms difficult to secure the workforce, which is needed for
goods production and supply. This is why Y sj is decreasing in θ̃
L, which shows the spillover
effect. The signal of own-market ambiguously works on goods supply determination since
the realized production inversely works on the profit and the inventory value.
The second equation is the first order condition for labor demand. The large goods
supply plan calls for large employment, so that Ldj is increasing in Y
s
j and θ̃
Y . θ̃L ambigu-
ously works on the labor demand. These are same as the conditions for goods supply.
On this equation, the real wage w decreases the labor demand. This is intuitive for profit
maximization problem.
Figure 3: First order conditions of firm j
As supposed above, the overbidding for compensation is not strong. Then, The firm’s
determination of goods supply and labor demand could be described as follows:


























The both variables could be interpreted as the firm’s activity level. The firm becomes
active (a) when the goods demand is relatively abundant, (b) when the labor supply is
relatively abundant, and (c) the real wage is low enough to secure its profit.
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2.3 Temporary equilibrium
We are ready to describe aggregate transactions of goods and labor. In the beginning,
we define the aggregate demand and supply variables as follows:




Y (θY ), θ̃L(θL);λ) di+G, (2.23)




Y (θY ), θ̃L(θL);λ) dj, (2.24)




Y (θY ), θ̃L(θL);λ) dj, (2.25)




Y (θY ), θ̃L(θL);λ) di, (2.26)
where λ denotes the exogenous variables.9 Hereinafter, we assume that the compara-
tive statics of individuals hold in the aggregate variables; for instance, the aggregated
consumption demand increases in the wage rate.
Temporary equilibrium is defined as the state in which (a) the aggregate quantity
signals accord with individuals’ expression in real markets, (b) the aggregate money and
dividend are completely allocated, and (c) the aggregate transaction is determined by the
aggregate quantity signals:
θY =
Y d(θY , θL;λ)


















Y = gY (Y d(θY , θL;λ), Y s(θY , θL;λ)) (2.31)
L = gL(Ld(θY , θL;λ), Ls(θY , θL;λ)) (2.32)
In a static model, the rationings on individuals is not determined since the ex post stock
variables are not important in our model.
We focus on the transactions of goods and labor. First, the partial equilibria in the
two markets are described in equations (2.27) and (2.28). These recursive definitions
shows that the aggregate quantity signals accord with the realized market tightnesses
in the both markets. Figure 4 shows how θY is determined in the goods market as θL
and the exogenous variables given. We could illustrate a similar figure for equantion
(2.28). We could interpret this figure as a special case of Keynesian cross since the
expressed demand and supply depend on the realized (or perceived) market tightness.
However, our cross is different from the ordinal Keynesian Cross in two points. First,
supply as well as demand is determined by the realized quantity signals. It comes from
the dual decision rule, in which every economic individual perceives quantity signals to
determine the expressions of demand and supply in every market. Ordinal Keynesian
models adopt this rule only to goods demand (households who determine consumption
9Note that if the rational expectation hypothesis holds, we can conclude that θ̃X = θX .
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45°
Figure 4: Determination of θY with given θL
demand depending on the realized income), but we adopt it to every individuals. Second,
the spill over effect is specified so that both the goods and labor markets are affected
by each other. In Michaillat and Saez (2013, 2015), goods demand is independent of the
(expected) employment and the market access cost plays an important role to connect
the markets; the relationship among markets is not completely described. In our model,
the economic individuals are affected by all quantity signals without any friction so that
the Keynesian cross in figure 4 shifts when the labor market signal θL changes.
The slope of the curve in figure 4 could be negative since it reflects partial (dis)equilibrium.
We could revise it by including labor market; by substituting equation (2.28) into equation
(2.28), we gain the general temporary equilibrium of (θY , θL) as θY = Y d(θY , θL(θY ))/Y s(θY , θL(θY )).
When the slope is positive and less than unity, the fiscal multiplier would be larger than
one.
Solving equations (2.27) and (2.28), we gain two equations θY = θY (θL;λ) and
θL = θL(θY ;λ) as shown in figure 5. The crossing point of the two curves is tempo-
rary equilibrium of (θY , θL).
How the two curves cross is important for comparative statics and uniqueness of






Lemma 1. If the spill-over effect is not too strong, the two curves in figure 5 uniquely
cross.





































Both of them are positive. The spill-over effect is detected as the absolute value of ηx
ξ
θz
where ξ = d, s and x ̸= z. If the values of them are sufficiently small, the slope conditions
are satisfied.
Figure 5 also shows how exogenous variable w affects θY and θL in temporary equi-
librium. The increase in w makes goods market tight and labor market slack in the first
11
Figure 5: Temporery equilibrium of θY and θL
place, as shown above. However, the first changes in θY and θL induce the changes in
them through the spill-over effect. Therefore the comparative statics of w is ambiguous.
Using definitions of θY and θL in equations (2.27) and (2.28), we could calculate how












































































































When the spill-over effect is not strong, the denominator of right hand sides of both
equations are positive.
For macroeconomic analysis, the aggregate quantity of realized transactions Y and L







= gX(θX , 1) (2.36)
fX could be interpreted as the average rationing on supply.












The change in exogenous variable λ affects both the market tightness θX , X = Y, L and
the supply Xs. Suppose that the goods demand strongly responds to the wage income
so that the realized θY is increasing in w. The increase in θY increases the realized
transaction Y as Y s given. However, this increase in θY is accompanied by the decrease
in Y s so that the change in Y is ambiguous.
2.4 Stability of quantity adjustment
In our fixed price economy, the expression of quantity should be adjusted. We describe
an example of this process, which is a counterpart of Walrasian tâtonnement process.
An auctioneer observes the expressed demand and supply and informs the individuals
12
of aggregate quantity signal (market tightness). The auctioneer adjusts the quantity
signals θY and θL, and the adjustments respond to the gap between the expressed market




Y d(θY , θL;λ)











where FX(0) = 0 and F
′
X > 0, X = Y, L. The Jacobian matrix around the steady state

































The stability condition of quantity tâtonnement process is as follows.
Proposition 1. If the following two inequalities hold, then the temporary equilibrium






















θY ) > 0. (2.42)
Proof. If inequality (2.41) holds, then the trace of J is negative. If inequality (2.42)
holds, then the determinant of J is positive. These condition show that the dynamical
system linearized around the steady state is asymptotically stable.
The stability conditions say that the slope of curve illustrated in figure 4 must be
under unity and the spill-over effect must not be too strong so that the slope conditions
in Lemma 1 hold.
Note that the adjustment described above is only a counterpart of Walrasian ad-
justment process and that we have not approach the brand new model which includes
both equilibrium and disequilibrium schools. For further dynamic adjustment studies,
we should adopt what is called non-tâtonnement model such as Hahn and Negishi (1962)
and Hahn (1978) to frictional economy. This is a future issue.
3 Macroeconomic interpretation of the static model
3.1 Fiscal multiplier
For Keynesian studies, fiscal multiplier is an important issue. By definition, the fiscal







































As the goods demand increases without change in goods supply, the goods transaction
itself increases. The scale of change, however, is ambiguous. The term of elasticities is
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positive, but the denominator would be large since the spill-over effect (e.g., ηL
d
θY ) is small.
When the multiplier becomes large? We should focus on the term Y
Y d
. Note that it tends
large when θY is small, that is, the multiplier would be large when the goods demand is
relatively small.
Seeing figure 5, we notice that the slopes of the curves are steep when θY is (or




increase in G shifts up the curve θY = θY (θL). How the crossing point moves is affected
by the slopes of the curves. When they are steep (θY is small), the increase in G induces
the large increase in θY at the crossing point.
Therefore, we attain a simple proposition: the fiscal multiplier would ba large when
the goods market is slack.
We should note that the spill-over (dual-decision) effect plays an important role in the
multiplier process. We have assumed that the own-market effect on demand is not large so
that the quantity adjustment process is stable. That is, the aggregate goods demand could
negatively responds to the aggregate goods market tightness under a given labor market
tightness. Therefore, partial equilibrium in figure 4 shows that the curve Y d/Y s has a
negative slope, which implies the fiscal multiplier is under unity. In general temporary
equilibrium, however, the upward pressure on goods market tightness also increases the
labor market tightness since the firms revise their sales expectations to optimistic. They
increase the labor demand, and then the consumption demand increases which generates
further upward pressure on the goods market tightness. This positive feedback through
the both markets is the multiplier process.
3.2 Regimes and source of unemployment
Ordinal non-Walrasian macroeconomic models have regimes, such as Keynesian unem-
ployment and repressed inflation. These regimes are defined by demand-supply gaps in
the goods and labor market, e.g., both excess supplies in the two market defines Keyne-
sian unemployment. Our model could use a similar definition; for instance, Keynesian
unemployment could be defined as the state with θY < 1 and θL < 1. However, we should
care about the name of regime. The situation is different from the deterministic models.
Note that the cause of unemployment is always mixed; that is, all the shortage of
goods demand, relative high wage, and market friction induce the unemployment. In
other words, the possible unemployment is (old or neo-) Keynesian, classical, and new
Keynesian.
Suppose that φLi < 1 for some household i (unemployed). Then the temporary equilib-
rium (θY , θL) must lie in the interior of [0, 1]× [0, 1]. First, suppose that the government
purchase G increases to stimulate goods demand Y d. Then, the curve θY = θY (θL) shifts
up without any change of labor supply so that the equilibrium value of θL increases, which
means the unemployment is cured. Second, suppose that the fixed nominal wage W goes
down by some policy. According to the firms’ first order conditions and positive Frishc
elasticity, the curve θL = θL(θY ) shifts to right side. However, the curve θY = θY (θL)
shifts down due to the decrease in consumption demand. If the former is stronger than
the latter, the employment rate fL(θ
L) rises. Third, suppose that the market friction is
partly eliminated so that the matching process is developed. This is expressed as the in-
crease in G(Y d, Y s) without changes of Y d and Y s. Since the realizations of transactions
grow without any conditions, the expected rationing function Ek[φ
X
k (θk)] goes up. For
this optimistic change, the goods and labor demand increases and the two curves of θY
14
and θL shifts same as the former two cases and the labor supply increases. Therefore,
the employment increases.
As described above, the strict distinctions of regimes are not suitable for our model.
The existence of friction not only induces unemployment but also makes the boundaries
of regimes obscure; see figure 6. Note that the effectiveness of each policy varies as the
values of (θY , θL) changes. As shown above, the expansin of G makes more increase in θY
which the values of (θY , θL) are low. In this sense, the economy with θY < 1 and θL < 1
has a strong Keynesian feature.
friction
Figure 6: The frictionless economy (dashed line) and the economy with friction (solid
line)
3.3 Multiple equilibria and indeterminancy
We have assumed that the aggregate expressed demand and supply are well-behaved so
that the temporary equilibrium uniquely exists as shown in figure 5. However, these
assumptions seem a little strict since we have not employed market frictions and specific
intertemporal maximization problems. Our model has the possibility to generate multiple
equilibria or indeterminate equilibrium as shown in figure 7.10
H
L
Figure 7: Multiple equilibria (left) and indeterminate equilibrium (right)
10Green (1980) shows that the demand or supply correspondences in an exchange economy could be
upper hemi-continuous with standard assumptions.
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The left one in figure 7 shows the case there are two equilibria; the one with low market
tightness (L) and the other with high (H). The example of multiple equilibria shows that
whether the economy is optimistic or pessimistic determines the realization of temporary
equilibrium (H or L), even though the fundamental variables λ is unchanged.11 This
feature is related to sun-spot equilibria; see Madden (1992) for non-Walrasian framework.
3.4 Information misspecification




the agent could use the correct information (θ̃Xk = θ
X) and the subjective expectation on
rationing is same as the objective one, their expression of demand and supply follows the
rational expectation hypothesis.
Suppose that the firms’ expectations for current transaction become pessimistic so
that the quantity constraint on goods supply is overestimated, that is, Ej[φ
Y
j ] is smaller
than the objective expectation.
According to the first order conditions, the firms decrease both the goods supply
and the labor demand. Firms become inactive. Then, the curve θY = θY (θL) shifts
up and the curve θL = θL(θY ) shifts to left in figure 8. Note that in these shifts the
households observe the change in market tightness so that they revise their decisions.
The labor market tightness and realized employment decrease since the firms restrict
employment for pessimistic expectation on sales. The change in goods market tightness θY
is, however, ambiguous since the firms decrease supply but the households also decreases
goods demand due to unemployment. When θY does not increase, the realized goods
transaction should decrease since the goods supply decreases.
This simple experiment shows how pessimistic expectation is enhanced in quantity
signal observations and that the expectation has a kind of self-filling feature in disequi-
librium model.
Figure 8: How pessimistic firm affects temporary equilibrium
11Note that if we utilize the quantity tâtonnement process, then the equilibrium H in the figure would
be locally asymptotically stable.
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4 Toward dynamic analysis
We have constructed the temporary equilibrium model in the static framework. The
most important issue left is to adopt our stochastic model to dynamic perspective to
construct Dynamic Stochastic General Disequilibrium (DSGD) model. The mathematical
formulation of model is beyond the scope of the present paper, and let us discuss it instead.
4.1 Expectation and information
In dynamics, the agents must make decisions considering the future. To accord with
the existing equilibrium models, suppose that the agents optimize their inter-temporal







tu(Ct, Lt)]subject to ∀τ(Cτ , Lτ ) ∈ E0[Γτ ], (4.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator at t = 0 and Γτ is a quantity constraint on the
household at t = τ . The crucial problem for disequilibrium theory is E0. How do agents
form the expectations on future quantity constraint (disequilibrium)? In the static model
above, the realized transaction for agent k, or xk, could hardly match both the expected
transaction Ek[xk] and the expressed demand or supply x
λ
k . Then, the agents must revise
the budget constraints (and then the expected quantity constraints) in all succeeding
periods so that the problem of time inconsistency is intrinsic in disequilibrium models.12
Furthermore, the economic agents do not necessarily know their stochastic rationing
mechanisms. It is difficult to justify that they know the correct relationship between
the perceived signals and the realized quantities. Therefore, the agents must update
the expectation of rationing function φXk in every period. Let us describe a simple dy-
namics.13 In each passed period t, agent k has expressed its demand and supply xλkt
and has been rationed the quantity xkt. Let Θkt denote the observed information set
which the agent k observes at period t. This includes the aggregate quantity signal and
expressions and transactions of other agents; (xλlt,xlt) where l ̸= k. Suppose that the




The agent k decides the current (t = 0, no time descriptions below) expressions of
demand and supply xλk depending on the past information set and the currently observed
information Θk. Note that the current information is affected aggregate quantity signal
and that the quantity signal is directly affected by xλk . The quantity adjustment converges
in each period so that the aggregate transaction quantity is determined. The agent
updates their information set with the observed information, the expressions and the
realized transactions to revise their expectations on quantity rationings in the following
periods.
The main question of learning dynamics is whether the economy converges into REE
(rational expectation equilibrium), which is same as the canonical static model above.
12If all the agents know all the rationings in future, the dynamic model would be a sticky-price model
and no unexpected unemployment occurs; see Ginsburgh et al. (1985) for the deterministic growth model.
The growth path could be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium so that only the price stickiness matters. It
is difficult to justify that optimal growth path as Keynesian unemployment.










Figure 9: The process of expectation revision
This is a difficult but interesting issue of modern non-Walrasian dynamic model. The
characteristic problem of non-Walrasian dynamics is that the agents should learn the
recursive structures of effective demand and supply. That is, the agents learns not only the
stochastic rationing mechanism on individuals (described as φ) but also how expressions
determine the final aggregate transaction (described as gX). As analyzed in the former
section, pessimistic underestimation makes the realized transaction small. This positive
feedback might bring about instability of learning dynamics and the economy moves in
such divergent path which describes secular stagnation (or recession) dynamics.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have constructed a simple canonical model which treats stochastic
rationing. The mathematical structure itself is not novel so much, but we have learned
interesting features. The most important one is that the market friction could not be
an alternative to Keynesian unemployment mechanism (goods demand shortage). It is
another resource of unemployment and combines classical and Keynesian unemployment
mechanisms. This is natural for non-Walrasian economics, but we explicitly described it
with the model.
We have also revealed how expectation works in non-Walrasian economics. The quan-
tity signals and individuals’ expectations are closely interconnected, and the quantity
signals play important roles in non-Walrasian economics in which quantity adjustment
is a main issue. The pessimistic expectation might induce unemployment without any
change in fundamental variables. To adopt our model to dynamic analysis, we should first
consider about expectation. We should note that the most of existing studies on expecta-
tions are on equilibrium assumptions, in that the quantity adjustment is not important.
To explore recession and stagnation, it is desirable to accumulate dynamic analysis in
disequilibrium framework.
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